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Introduction and Background 
The list of disease pathogens that can be transmitted in the air is extensive. This list 
includes the common cold, SARS, measles, Hansen's disease (leprosy), polio, influenza, 
Legionella (Legionnaires’ disease and Pontiac fever), and tuberculosis (TB). TB, SARS-
CoV-1, avian influenza, varicella, and now SARS-CoV-2 all have received public notice 
due not only to their known or assumed ability to be transmitted in the air rapidly from one 
individual to another, but also for their virulence. Other bioaerosols that can be transmitted 
through the air include bacteria, fungal spores and fragments, dust mites, and pollen. This 
document was developed to address control of bioaerosols transmission, primarily 
through ventilation and other engineering controls. This monograph will focus on 
engineering controls in non-industrial/non-healthcare facilities such as office buildings, 
schools, public assembly, theaters, and governmental buildings. It does not, however, 
address ventilation in residences, either single or multi-family.   
Modes of Transmission for Bioaerosols 
1. Definitions
Various definitions are commonly used by infection control, industrial hygiene, and public 
health practitioners to define the types of potential transmission modes resulting in 
respiratory infections. The following section will define, in relatively simple language, 
several particle and transmission-related terms in an attempt to clarify the various 
transmission modalities from a physical and biological perspective. 
Particles includes all types and forms of particulate matter, regardless of dimension 
(size), mass, and form. Particles can be solid or liquid, and may be comprised of any 
form, or combination, of matter (e.g., mineral, biological, etc.).  
Droplets are variously defined depending on the context and practice area. Droplets can 
range from a few micrometers (µm) in diameter to >1000 µm (1, 2), but any that are >100 
µm tend to settle rapidly. Droplets from a respiratory emissions perspective are generally 
described as high velocity (ballistic) particles of saliva or respiratory fluid that are greater 
than 100 µm in size that are expelled from infected individuals (3, 4). From an industrial 
hygiene perspective, droplets are particles that are large enough that they remain 
airborne only briefly before settling out due to gravity. Droplets as large as 200 µm may 
still travel up to 1.5 meters from a coughing person before settling (5). Also, keep in mind 
that droplets greater than 100 µm are not considered inhalable, and infection resulting 
from droplets >100 µm would be considered via the droplet transmission pathway as 
opposed to inhalation pathway.  
Droplet transmission is transmission from a source to a receptor via high velocity 
droplets (ballistic droplets) expelled by the infected individual. Transmission is more likely 
to occur when someone is close to the infected individual. 
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Droplet nuclei are particles derived from larger droplets through desiccation resulting in 
a smaller, lighter particle. Droplet nuclei are generally defined as particles that are less 
than 5 µm in size (6) although some use higher cut-offs since particles larger than 5 µm 
can remain airborne for extended periods of time. 
  
Aerosols are fine solid or liquid particles that are suspended in air regardless of their size 
(7) but are generally in a size range that can be suspended in air for more than a few 
seconds (8). A standard industrial hygiene definition of aerosols is a suspension of solid 
or liquid particles in a gaseous medium typically ranging in size up to 100 µm in diameter, 
which can be suspended in air and be inhaled into the respiratory tract (7, 9). By this 
definition, aerosols include droplet nuclei as well as smaller droplets. Aerosols may be 
suspended for longer times when air currents are present to maintain the aerosols in an 
airborne state (8).  
 
Airborne transmission is another term that is defined differently depending on the 
scientific and technical field in which it is used. Airborne transmission generally includes 
aerosols, droplet nuclei, and other particles <100 µm that can travel more than a meter 
or two and remain suspended in air for more than a few seconds. Regarding infectious 
disease transmission, airborne transmission is transmission via particles that remain 
suspended in air for sufficient periods, such that they can be disseminated or travel over 
long distances, while still retaining their biological viability and/or remain capable of 
replication (viruses).  
 
Contact transmission is transmission from a source to a receptor typically through 
physical contact with an infected individual (e.g., touching during a handshake) or 
contaminated surfaces (fomites).  
 
2. Transmission via Droplets, Aerosols, and Droplet Nuclei  
 
People with contagious respiratory infections may produce droplets and smaller aerosols 
when they cough, sneeze, or engage in other forced respiratory activities that generate 
high velocity airflow over the thin fluid layer covering the respiratory mucosa. When the 
particles are >100 µm, this type of transmission is generally referred to as droplet 
transmission (4). Aerosol transmission may also occur through speaking and breathing, 
especially vigorous actions such as shouting, singing, and heavy physical exertion, which 
generate particles smaller than typical droplets (8, 10). It appears that relatively smaller 
particles are derived from the deeper lung regions as compared to the upper airways and 
oral cavity (8, 11, 12). Many respiratory droplets are large enough to see or feel, and such 
large particles may contain dozens of microorganisms or hundreds of viruses (13). 
However, Schlieren imaging and strobe photography have revealed that much larger 
clouds of smaller particles (i.e., aerosols) accompany these larger particles. Many of the 
droplet-size particles rapidly shrink in size as a result of dehydration to form droplet nuclei 
(14, 15). Droplets, droplet nuclei, and other aerosols containing microorganisms are the 




Particles capable of infectious disease transmission can generally be segregated into two 
classes: airborne and non-airborne particles (16). Non-airborne or contact particle 
transmission would include droplets and other large particles that settle rapidly and are 
only transmitted via close contact with an infected individual. However, particles that are 
not “true” airborne particles still can pass through the air directly from an infectious person 
to another, uninfected, individual. As noted above, airborne particles are those that can 
remain suspended in the air such that they can be disseminated over longer distances 
than droplets while retaining their infectivity. Aerosols from other sources (e.g., medical 
aerosol generating procedures such as intubation, bronchoscopy, and nebulization 
conducted on infectious patients, and mechanical systems such as misters and cooling 
towers) also can generate droplets, droplet nuclei, and other aerosols containing 
potentially infectious microorganisms.  
 
The size of the particle is an important determinant of airborne and contact transmission, 
as the aerodynamic particle diameter can determine both the distance the particle may 
travel in air, and whether and where it will settle onto surfaces, as well as where the 
particle is most likely to deposit within the host’s respiratory tract or other mucosa (8, 17). 
For this reason, physical (social) distancing between individuals is a very important 
pathway control when considering larger particles such as droplets that travel short 
distances at high velocity but settle rapidly. Spread of pathogens by these larger particles 
relies on direct contact to the mucosa or contact with settled particles on surfaces. Smaller 
aerosols and droplet nuclei can reach receptors by travelling on air currents, being 
recirculated by ventilation systems, and by going over and around protection such as 
temporary protective barriers, face shields, and face coverings that are not tight-fitting. 
Smaller particles can follow air currents within rooms, including air currents generated 
through ventilation, respiration, thermal plumes, and fans. They are diluted and removed 
by ventilation, filtration, and surface static charges that attract the smaller particles (e.g., 
walls and other surfaces), or they can increase their size through particle agglomeration 
and settle out on horizontal surfaces.  
 
The dynamics of airborne infections that spread from person-to-person have been 
analyzed using mass-balance equations, similar to those applied to the study of other 
environmental contaminants (18-24). These models demonstrate that the expected 
number of cases among a given number of susceptible persons is generally proportional 
to the average concentration of infectious droplet nuclei in a room, the probability that the 
particles will be inhaled, and the ability of the inhaled particles to infect the host (i.e., 
whether the dose and infectivity of an agent is sufficient to result in an infection). Because 
the concentration of smaller aerosols and droplet nuclei in a room is generally proportional 
both to the number of infected persons present in the room that are expiring the infectious 
agent, and to the generation rate of infectious agents, the probability of transmission is 
related to time, distance from the source, dilution and air mixing, airflow patterns, and the 
number of airborne infectious particles. Thus ventilation, along with spending less time in 






Airborne Transmission within Buildings  
 
Historically, with the exception of measles and tuberculosis, airborne transmission of 
respiratory pathogens has been viewed with skepticism by researchers, scientists, and 
medical professionals, with the belief that most pathogens are transmitted by means of 
large infectious respiratory droplets (e.g., >60 µm in diameter) (25) over distances of two 
meters or less and through contact with contaminated surfaces. One of the reasons for 
this skepticism is the difficulty in detecting the airborne agent. Infectious aerosols are 
usually present at very low concentrations (compared to non-biological particles), and 
most air sampling methods affect viability and infectivity of the agent, particularly viruses, 
thereby limiting or preventing recovery and detection. As a result, culture analysis is 
problematic for determining the true concentration of infectious airborne viruses (26). 
Newer analytical methods, employing quantitative reverse transcriptase-polymerase 
chain reaction (qRT-PCR) to detect nucleic acids, including viral RNA, afford a sensitive 
and rapid approach to quantifying low concentrations of organism-specific nuclei acids. 
These analytical methods, however, cannot differentiate between viable and non-viable 
and infectious and inactive agents. 
 
The numerous outbreaks of person-to-person airborne infections that have been studied 
in detail suggest two transmission patterns: within-room and beyond-room exposure. 
Within-room transmission occurs when an infectious individual and susceptible person 
occupy the same room, the air is relatively quiescent, and droplet nuclei and/or aerosols 
accumulate and disperse within the space. Beyond-room transmission occurs when, due 
to pressure differentials, airflow patterns, ventilation systems, and other factors, air 
contaminated with infectious agents moves between adjacent spaces. Particle 
recirculation describes the entrainment of infectious particles into the return air of a 
mechanical ventilation system, from which they are then distributed (or redistributed) 
throughout the building via the ventilation system. There is ample evidence demonstrating 
an association between ventilation and the control of airflow directions in buildings and 
the transmission and spread of airborne infections, including tuberculosis, measles, 
chickenpox, and SARS (27). 
 
Airborne Near-Field and Far-Field Exposures  
 
Within a room, contact between a source and a worker can be described as either near-
field or far-field, depending on the distance separating the two. Closer proximity to a 
source implies exposure to a potentially higher local concentration of bioaerosols. Indeed, 
a study from Kulkarni et al. (28) reported that infectious aerosol concentrations of 
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) were significantly lower at five meters away from an 
index case as compared to one meter away, and that these aerosols were non-detected 
at 10 meters distance. The degree of risk, however, depends on the balance between the 
rate at which a source generates infectious particles and the rate at which they settle out 
and are dispersed by air currents within the room and subsequently removed via exhaust 
air and exfiltration. For example, near-field exposure to a person with measles, who is 
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generating a large, local cloud of infectious particles, might convey substantial risk, even 
for a brief exposure. On the other hand, far-field exposure would carry less risk, because 
the total infectious particle concentration would be significantly lower further from the 
source (28). In contrast, near-field exposure to a TB case of average to low infectiousness 
may not substantially increase a worker’s risk, relative to that of far-field exposure for the 
same duration (29). Therefore, estimates of risk and potential exposure vary with each 
type of bioaerosol and its virulence. 
 
Dissemination of Infectious Aerosols  
 
Transmission of airborne agents can occur in a variety of ways. The airborne transmission 
of many infectious agents, such as viruses and TB, generally rely on a human source 
expiring the agent into the air, as opposed to an environmental source that becomes 
airborne.  Environmental sources differ from human or other animal sources because the 
infectious agent can remain viable and propagate outside the body in the general, 
although sometimes specialized, environment. For example, transmission of Legionella 
bacteria and infectious fungi, such as Aspergillus fumigatus and Cryptococcus 
neoformans, are typically associated with environmental sources rather than human or 
other animal sources. In addition, some organisms can be transmitted indirectly from 
human-to-human, as in the case of vectors and vehicles. In the case of vectors, a non-
human organism (e.g., mosquitos, ticks, etc.) carries and transmits an infectious 
pathogen from one source into another without becoming infected by the pathogen. A 
vehicle refers to substances or articles, such as food, water, blood, and fomites that can 
indirectly transmit an infectious agent to a susceptible host. 
 
Human-to-human airborne transmission of infectious aerosols has been demonstrated 
primarily through studies that have occurred on transmission in healthcare settings. 
Studies on varicella-zoster virus (VZV) have demonstrated that the virus is able to travel 
long distances, via airborne routes, and cause secondary infections (30, 31). Several 
studies of measles outbreaks in outpatient clinics, some of which included retrospective 
airflow dynamics analysis, have reported that airborne spread of the virus was the most 
likely mode of transmission (18, 20, 32). Numerous TB outbreak investigations have 
confirmed the transmissibility of biological agents via the airborne route (33-36).  
 
Whether or not certain organisms, most notably viruses, can be transmitted via the 
airborne route has been the subject of much debate. Numerous articles have 
demonstrated the ability of aerosols containing viruses to migrate within large spaces or 
become entrained in ventilation systems while maintaining infectivity, including SARS-
CoV-1 (37, 38), MERS (39), and SARS-CoV-2 (40, 41). Studies have also demonstrated 
the presence of viral nucleic acids in HVAC systems (42-45). However, airborne 
transmission critics point out that these studies cannot prove the virus is active and are 
therefore insufficient in confirming the airborne route of pathogens because the virus has 
not successfully been grown in tissue culture. For example, Nissen et al. (46) reported 
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that SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA was detected in central ventilation system exhaust filters in 
a hospital over 50 meters from COVID-19 patient wards, indicating that the virus can 
potentially be transported long distances. Although the infectiousness of the agent at that 
distance was not determined, the authors concluded that there may be a risk for airborne 
dissemination and transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Unfortunately, proving 
infectivity is difficult since sampling typically occurs long after the virus has been expelled 
into the environment resulting in inactivation, and because sampling and culturing viruses 
is difficult due to multiple environmental and technical factors (44, 47). 
 
Preventing and Controlling Exposure 
 
Selecting appropriate and effective control measures can be challenging and depends on 
the nature and the source of the bioaerosol. Source elimination and avoiding exposure 
altogether removes the risk. However, complete exposure avoidance is not usually 
possible for human-derived sources, such as viruses that spread by droplets, aerosols, 
and droplet nuclei. Each control measure described in the hierarchy of controls, as 
described in the next section, offers varying levels of exposure reduction. Identifying 
proper exposure control measures is critical to reducing risk when employee exposure to 
biological agents is unavoidable. 
 
Fundamentally, risk is a function of a hazard and a person’s potential or known exposure 
to that hazard. When controlling a biological hazard, there is a need to identify all relevant 
factors involved in risk. Since risk involves both the likelihood of incidence and the 
potential severity of the hazard, an evaluation of the factors influencing “likelihood of 
incidence” and “severity” must be considered (48). Factors impacting likelihood of 
exposure to bioaerosols include: proximity to the source(s), health screening practices, 
building operations and ventilation factors, and cleaning practices. Severity of the hazard 
depends on the virulence of the agent involved, potential health effects, and individual 
susceptibility factors, such as age and comorbidities. Unfortunately, our understanding of 
the magnitude and severity of hazardous biological agents is often incomplete. When 
possible, and practical, environmental testing is appropriate for identifying the specific 
biological agents, characterizing their ability to cause adverse health effects, and 
understanding the potential exposure pathways. These tests, and their results, are 
needed to understand the hazards posed from contaminated environments or infectious 
sources.  
 
Decision matrices are commonly used to assess the risk from chemical exposures but 
can also be used to assess risks from biological agents. Appendix A outlines a decision 
matrix process that can take these factors into account when deciding on control 
measures. Often, a layered risk minimization strategy that includes engineering, 
administrative, and personal protective equipment (PPE) controls is recommended.  
 
1. Hierarchy of Controls 
 
Controlling exposures to occupational hazards is the fundamental method of protecting 
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workers.  Traditionally, a hierarchy of controls has been used as a means of determining 
how to implement feasible and effective control solutions. Figure 1 depicts a 




FIGURE 1: Hierarchy of Controls  
Source: NIOSH (49). 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the methods of controlling a hazard generally become less effective 
moving down the hierarchy.  
 
• Elimination is the physical removal of the hazard. Applying this method 
specifically to airborne infectious agents, this method could include elimination of 
naturally occurring infections, as has occurred with smallpox through vaccination 
efforts (50). This method could include the limiting/removal/prohibition of infected 
sources from being present in an environment, and the removal of contaminated 
sources, such as disinfection of water systems and mold remediation. 
• Substitution is replacing the hazard with something less hazardous. This 
particular hazard control does not apply to airborne infectious agents. 
• Engineering controls are those that help to isolate people from the hazard. These 
controls are favored over administrative controls and PPE for controlling exposures 
because they are designed to remove or reduce the hazard. Isolating 
contaminated spaces, implementing local exhaust ventilation, increasing supply 
air ventilation rates, introducing additional outside air to dilute airborne agent 
concentrations, redirecting airflow to avoid spreading bioaerosols, improving 
filtration, and using ultraviolet (UV) light to kill or deactivate the airborne agents are 
all examples of engineering controls. 
• Administrative controls are those that change the ways people work while they 
are exposed to a hazard. Immunization of workers against the infectious agent of 
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concern, working remotely to limit the number of persons who are exposed to 
bioaerosols, limiting the number of persons in common or enclosed areas, and 
enforcing social distancing are all examples of administrative controls. During the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, administrative controls used included working remotely, 
limiting the number of employees in common or enclosed areas (e.g., break rooms, 
conference rooms, elevators), enforcing social distancing by removing chairs or 
use of floor markings, and providing alternate areas for employees to eat that 
maintain appropriate separation. Careful handling of contaminated materials to 
minimize release and dissemination of bioaerosols would also be an administrative 
control.  
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) is respiratory equipment or other gear that 
protects individuals from airborne agents. This control includes protection of the 
respiratory system (e.g., respiratory protective equipment) as well as specific body 
parts (e.g., hands, eyes, head, etc.).  
 
All of these types of controls have a place in protecting workers from bioaerosols. In many 
instances, multiple controls are needed.  
 
2. Elimination, Source Control, and Source Reduction  
 
Elimination of the source of bioaerosols is the best way to reduce the potential for 
exposure and the associated risk. For some infectious agents, however, elimination of 
the source is not possible or practical. In those cases, reducing the number of infectious 
sources in a building or occupied space is the next best option. This could occur through 
requiring workers who are ill to not report to work, implementation of medical or health 
screenings prior to entry, and requiring vaccination or other immune status testing. In a 
pandemic setting, working remotely and limiting occupancy will also reduce the potential 
number of infectious sources in a building or workplace.  
   
Reducing the number of infectious sources (e.g., contagious individuals) in a community 
is the general role of medical care personnel and facilities and the particular role of public 
health programs and facilities. In the case of certain airborne diseases (e.g., TB), 
physicians diagnose and treat individual patients while local public health programs work 
to ensure that patients remain on therapy until they are no longer infectious and are 
ultimately cured. Public health programs also perform contact tracing so that exposed 
family members, coworkers, and other individuals that may have been contacted by 
infectious sources can be identified and evaluated for disease. These efforts have 
historically resulted in fewer infectious TB cases in the community, and less TB 
transmission (51).  
 
Breathing, talking, coughing, and sneezing all generate aerosols, with a high degree of 
variability from individual to individual (52-55). Instances of superspreading events, where 
one individual infected multiple people, whereas other infectious individuals infected few 
or none, have been documented (37, 56-58). Detection of infected individuals and 
initiation of effective treatment can reduce the number of infectious particles that 
individuals release by reducing the number of infectious agents in the body. For diseases 
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that spread from person-to-person, simple prevention measures such as covering coughs 
and sneezes with an elbow, tissue, or face covering, can reduce the number of large 
respiratory droplets available to the receptor. These measures can also help limit the 
number of particles that subsequently become droplet nuclei through evaporation. 
 
Measures to control microbial colonization and growth on building materials (e.g., 
moisture control, proper heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system 
maintenance and operation, etc.) can reduce the potential number of environmental 
sources of opportunistic pathogens to which occupants may be exposed. Prompt 
response to moisture intrusion and other water damage can prevent mold growth. Prompt 
attention to remediating mold contamination can minimize potential occupant exposures 
to allergens, irritants, and other bioaerosols (59). 
 
For waterborne environmental infectious agents, such as Legionella, it is crucial that the 
production of contaminated aerosols, which may then be inhaled by susceptible 
individuals, be minimized or eliminated. Outbreaks of disease have been reported 
involving mist- and aerosol-generating water features, including decorative fountains (60, 
61), hot tubs and spas (62, 63), humidifiers (64, 65), and even grocery store vegetable 
mist machines (66, 67). Cooling towers have also been implicated in multiple community-
wide outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease, in some cases infecting hundreds of individuals 
(68-73). Since even well-maintained cooling towers can still be colonized by Legionella 
bacteria, it is important to control and eliminate, to the extent possible, the potential 
transmission of contaminated aerosols from mist- and aerosol-generating water features, 
and from cooling towers to susceptible populations (74).  
 
Limiting exposure time can also be a method of reducing risk. The duration of exposure 
required for biological agent transmission is dependent on the agent, the airborne 
concentration of the agent, the dose required for infection, the environmental conditions, 
and the immune status of the individuals. The air concentration of infectious agents 
depends on the number of infectious sources present, the rate at which these sources 
generate infectious aerosols, the size of the space in which the infectious sources are 
released, and the effectiveness of ventilation to remove or dilute the concentration of 
infectious particles in the air. 
 
Removal of Bioaerosols  
 
The average concentration of bioaerosols is related to the number of sources and the rate 
at which those sources generate infectious agents. While source control and elimination 
constitute a higher, and potentially more effective, control measure for person-to-person 
contagions such as SARS-CoV-2 and other viruses, immunization and cessation of 
community spread are typically beyond employer and building operator control.  
 
The airborne concentration of bioaerosols is also related to the rates at which the 
microorganisms die, become inactive, deposit, or leave an area. The natural susceptibility 
of agents to various environmental conditions plays a role in reducing the number of 
infectious particles available for direct contact or inhalation. Little data are available 
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regarding the natural attenuation rates of airborne infectious agents under ambient indoor 
conditions. The effects of temperature, relative humidity (RH), and absolute humidity on 
microorganism viability and particle size are important factors (75-83). The measles virus 
has been found to persist in an infectious state for at least an hour while airborne in an 
office setting (20, 32).  
 
Experimental studies of SARS-CoV-2, under controlled conditions using a rotating drum, 
have suggested a viable half-life in air of ~1.2 hours (84, 85). Biryukov (85) investigated 
the effects of relative humidity, temperature, and droplet size on the stability of SARS-
CoV-2 in a simulated clinically relevant matrix dried on nonporous surfaces. The results 
demonstrated that SARS-CoV-2 decayed more rapidly when either humidity or 
temperature was increased, but that neither droplet volume (1 to 50 microliter [μl]), nor 
deposition surface type (stainless steel, plastic, or nitrile glove), significantly impacted 
decay rate (85). Another study indicated that SARS-CoV-2 survives better at low 
temperatures and extreme relative humidity levels (84).  
 
Absolute humidity may also affect airborne transmission of influenza. It may also provide 
a “framework that helps to explain the timing of both epidemic and pandemic influenza in 
temperate regions” (79). Humidity can affect viral transmission of Influenza A viruses as 
a result of its effect on droplet size and dehydration, and inactivation, which may explain 
the variability of airborne transmission in temperate regions (86). Humidity may also play 
a role in receptor susceptibility as low RH (< 40%) may result in impairment of mucociliary 
clearance and other immunologic dysfunction (87). Fungal and bacterial spores, as well 
as amebic cysts, may be assumed to remain viable and infectious for as long as they are 
airborne. 
 
Particle deposition by diffusion, electrostatic precipitation, gravitational settling, and 
thermophoresis acts to remove infectious aerosols from their suspension in air. 
Resuspension of deposited particles may occur through occupant activities that cause 
disruption or turbulent air movement (4, 88-91). In most situations, particle deposition 
plays a small role in the removal of bioaerosols relative to other mechanisms, such as 
local exhaust and general ventilation (92). Implementing effective engineering controls 
offers the most promising and immediate approach to protect multiple workers and 
building occupants. Ventilation, if designed and implemented properly, can play a critical 
role in controlling the dissemination of bioaerosols throughout workplaces, and reducing 
airborne transmission of infectious agents.  
 
3. Ventilation  
 
The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers 
(ASHRAE) (93) defines ventilation as the process of supplying air to, or removing air from, 
a space for the purpose of controlling air contaminant levels, humidity, or temperature 
within a space. Natural ventilation is provided by thermal gradients, wind loading, and 
diffusional effects through windows, doors, or other intentional or unintentional openings 
in the building envelope. This discussion will focus on mechanical ventilation systems 
utilizing powered equipment, such as fans or blowers. These systems lend themselves to 
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more precise controls that enable specific air delivery rates and directed airflow. Auxiliary 
devices, such as louvers, dampers, and supply and exhaust air registers and grilles, aid 
in further adjusting the movement of air into, out of, and within the space requiring control.   
 
Ventilation standards, such as ASHRAE Standard 62.1, which prescribe ventilation rates 
for certain commercial and industrial spaces, have historically been used to provide 
guidance for the control of occupant-generated and low-level indoor air pollutants. 
General ventilation has been used to reduce the particle load within a space, including 
incidence of infectious diseases transmitted from person-to-person through the air (e.g., 
the common cold and tuberculosis) (93-95). However, ASHRAE Standard 62.1 was not 
developed to control infectious disease transmission.  Therefore, past and current 
ventilation standards geared toward the control of contaminants should not be relied upon 
to prevent transmission of airborne infectious diseases. Nevertheless, the recommended 
minimum ventilation rates may, to some degree, reduce airborne infections (94, 96). 
Higher ventilation rates have been proposed to prevent the transmission of airborne 
diseases (93).  
 
Ventilation, if designed and implemented properly, plays a critical role in reducing 
workplace airborne contaminants. The use of ventilation to mitigate disease spread in a 
pandemic plays a critical role in reducing virus-containing droplet nuclei and aerosols in 
the air. This in turn helps to reduce the risk of airborne transmission of disease. The two 
types of ventilation that can remove and thus reduce the concentration of airborne 
contaminants are local exhaust ventilation (LEV) and general ventilation (GV).  
LEV involves the removal of contaminants generated within a space by the use of various 
designs of capture devices (i.e., hoods). This capture takes place as close to the source 
of the contaminant generation as possible. Examples of LEV in commercial buildings 
include kitchen range hood exhausts and exhausts on sewage injector pumps, among 
others. LEV is more frequently utilized in industrial, laboratory, and healthcare settings. 
The reader is referred to a variety of industrial ventilation resources such as the ACGIH 
Industrial Ventilation Design Manual (97). Historically, the term general ventilation (GV) 
has been applied to the concept of providing a combination of clean outside air and 
cleaned recirculated air for acceptable indoor air quality in non-industrial applications. The 
intent is to reduce indoor contaminants such as carbon dioxide, body odor, and low-level, 
low toxicity indoor pollutants, while providing thermal conditioning in an energy-efficient 
manner.   
 
The term general exhaust ventilation (GEV) is often used interchangeably with GV. 
However, GEV emphasizes the exhaust portion of the general ventilation system where 
contaminant generation and its control are major considerations. For example, the focus 
could be on exhaust components that draw large volumes of contaminated air for 
discharge to the outdoors, such as with power roof ventilators or wall panel fans. In reality, 
GEV consists not only of exhaust fans, but also the makeup air (MUA) that replaces the 
air that was removed. Thus, it is equally appropriate to refer to GEV as general ventilation. 
This MUA requirement is best met with dedicated supply MUA systems to avoid the 
uncontrolled influx of unconditioned air through openings in the building envelope such 
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as windows, doors, louvers, or vents. For most non-industrial settings, a single 
recirculating HVAC system provides the general ventilation, rather than separate exhaust 
and MUA systems. The factors that determine how effective a ventilation system is in 
reducing the risk to airborne transmission of infectious disease are the combination of the 
amount of “fresh” outdoor air being introduced into the building and the level of filtration 
of the air that is recirculated.    
 
The Role and Limitations of Outdoor Air  
 
Since contaminant exposure is controlled by removing contaminated air and replacing it 
with clean (or cleaner) air, ideally replacement or MUA would consist of outside air that is 
free of contaminants of concern. This is not always the case, however, in that outside air 
is not guaranteed to be clean or free of contaminants. Such contaminants may include 
bioaerosols such as pollens or mold spores; ambient pollutant gases and vapors such as 
ozone, sulfur dioxide, or nitrogen oxides; fine or ultrafine particulate matter such as 
ambient dusts, smokes, and tailpipe or stack particulate matter; and motor vehicle 
exhaust, cooling tower emissions, and building stack and other exhausts that are located 
too near to and/or upwind of building air intakes.   
 
Another consideration regarding the use of outside air for indoor contaminant dilution is 
the physical attributes of outside air, including temperature and moisture content 
(humidity). The use of 100% outdoor air, although preferred due to the higher 
contamination control potential, is rarely possible with existing systems. Most currently 
installed HVAC systems are not capable of conversion to 100% outside air. This is 
primarily due to inadequate heating and cooling capacity, especially under extreme 
temperature and humidity conditions. The alternative is to introduce the maximum amount 
of outdoor air that the system can accommodate. This is then coupled with the 
conditioning of the mixed outdoor air and building return air with the appropriate level of 
filtration, heating and cooling, and dehumidification. The critical issue is that the MUA and 
recirculated air should have little or no contamination.   
 
Regarding ventilation air and infectious aerosols, there is concern with the effects of 
humidity and temperature on the propagation and deposition of infectious aerosols. Ward 
and Xiao (98) found a consistently negative relationship between relative humidity and 
the number of infectious cases. Increased relative humidity was associated with 
decreased cases in both epidemic phases (i.e., ascending and descending). Lower 
relative humidity causes aerosols to desiccate, resulting in lighter and smaller particles 
that tend to remain suspended longer (98). Low relative humidity may also contribute to 
an increase in respiratory illness by weakening the defenses provided by the mucous 
membranes.   
 
General Ventilation  
 
General ventilation can reduce and remove airborne contaminants in one of two distinct 




1) Dilution ventilation is where the intent is to mix (thus, dilute) contaminated air with 
clean air to lower the concentration of the contaminant to below some 
recommended or accepted safe level to avoid adverse health effects. A safe level 
of virus load is difficult to establish. Therefore, if this is the only method available, 
it is most effective with as much clean dilution air as possible and with as much 
complete air mixing as possible.   
 
2) Displacement ventilation is used where the intent is to keep overall room air mixing 
to a minimum. Instead, the intent is to push the contaminated air away from the 
breathing zone in as close to a laminar, directed flow as is possible, thereby 
replacing contaminated room air parcels with clean ones. Displacement ventilation 
has been recommended as an important approach to minimize occupant exposure 
to highly infectious agents (99-101). 
 
Turbulent, mixed flow of dilution ventilation involves installing exhaust outlets or exhaust 
fans at various nonspecific locations, with MUA also delivered at random or nonspecific 
locations. Enhanced mixed flow includes mixing devices, such as ceiling-mounted or 
floor-standing fans. The intent is to more homogenously mix contaminants within the 
space before exhausting them, thus diluting the overall concentration. However, it must 
be remembered that turbulent mixing is likely to increase the potential for occupant 
exposure.  
 
For infectious aerosols, where each occupant is a potential contaminant source, the 
airflow pattern is the most critical issue to determine, modify, and control. For a general 
ceiling exhaust system with open doors, windows, or vents as the only source of available 
replacement air, consideration should be given to installation of a ducted, powered supply 
air system with low velocity airflow introduced at or near floor level (102). The supply air 
can then move past workers and up to the exhaust without passing other workers. If there 
is an existing supply air system, it is important to consider modifying the system to duct 
and deliver the air at or near floor level. Figure 2 illustrates an example of an appropriate 
supply/exhaust airflow arrangement.  
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FIGURE 2: Displacement Ventilation 
Source: ACGIH (103). 
 
In directed flow, air from the supply diffuser may be specified to direct the airflow from the 
outlet toward a contaminant source where the contaminant may then become entrained 
in the supply airstream and directed to the exhaust grille in line with the flow direction. 
This arrangement tends to create some turbulence and mixing of the clean airstream with 
the contaminated airstream. However, much of the mixed contaminated airstream may 
be captured by the exhaust or return air grille. This may be applicable to individual 
workstations where supply air is directed into the workstation, (e.g., a cubicle) with a 
return air grille located above the cubicle. Directed flow may be capable of removing 
contaminants utilizing lower airflows than turbulent flow systems.   
 
Vertically directed displacement ventilation, taking advantage of thermal displacement, 
should effectively reduce risk of worker exposure to potentially infectious aerosols 
exhaled by other workers. This method introduces slightly cooler air at a low level along 
the floor, allowing the heat from occupants and other sources (e.g., electronic equipment) 
to warm the air, causing it to rise toward the upper portion of the space where it can then 
be removed through exhaust or return grilles located at or near the ceiling. This protocol 
minimizes air mixing and raises contaminants up and out of the breathing zone of the 
workers. To understand thermal plume for a human being, consider that the air expelled 
from human lungs is significantly lighter and more buoyant than the surrounding 
conditioned air because of its inherent relative humidity and human body warmth (see 
Figure 3). In general, replacing air is preferable to mixing air with high velocities when a 





FIGURE 3: Thermal Plume in Displacement Ventilation  
Source: Price Industries (102). 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates the difference between displacement and dilution/mixing 
regarding virus distribution. Notice the location of the virions (depicted as blue dots) with 
each type of ventilation. The white box in the bottom right corner is a low-velocity, non-
turbulent supply air diffuser, while the circular object at the top left is a high-velocity supply 
air diffuser. 
 
FIGURE 4: Mixing vs. Displacement Ventilation and the Difference in Virus Distribution 




Circulating and Mixing Fans 
 
Large ceiling fans will cause downflow of air around the occupants, and it will return 
buoyant bioaerosol particles back towards the occupants’ breathing zone. Taking ceiling 
fans offline during a pandemic should be considered. Personal cooling fans are another 
source of air movement. It is important to make sure that a fan does not blow air directly 
from one worker towards another. The preferred airflow arrangement is vertical 
displacement with airflow moving up through the worker’s breathing zone so that it can 
be exhausted at or near the ceiling. 
 
4. HVAC System Design and Operation 
 
Proper sizing of HVAC equipment to meet occupancy demands (specifically, air-
conditioning and dehumidifying capacity) is critical for temperature control and moisture 
removal from ventilation air. Dilution ventilation using filtered outdoor and/or recirculated 
indoor air can reduce the concentration of some externally or internally sourced 
bioaerosols. Excepting Legionella spp., external (outdoor) sources are generally not a 
significant concern. However, dilution ventilation is ineffective where the sources are 
downstream of the HVAC system’s filters, or where sources within a building emit 
infectious particles at rates greater than the removal rate provided by the ventilation 
system. In addition, increased air velocities may elevate indoor bioaerosol concentrations 
if the increased turbulence causes biological particle release from areas of microbial 
surface contamination (104).   
 
General ventilation may be quantified in terms of the air exchange rate within a space, 
expressed as air changes per hour (ACH). ACH is the volume of clean air delivered to a 
space per hour divided by the volume of that space. In general, increasing the ACH can 
increase the dilution rate (for mixed flow), or the removal rate (for displacement flow), of 
indoor generated contaminants.   
 
It is important not to confuse increased total air volume (as ACH) with increased air 
velocity.  Increases in total air volume should be accompanied by additional air supply 
devices (e.g., registers, diffusers, and grilles) to maintain steady discharge and return air 
velocities. Increases in ACH may be effective in the reduction of fine airborne droplet 
nuclei and certain fungal elements, such as spores and mycelial fragments. However, 
excessive air velocities can result in the reduction of settling coefficients as a removal 
mechanism. Thus, the increase in ACH in a dilution ventilation airflow arrangement can 
result in an increase in both the time that the particles remain airborne and the distance 




Inadequate and improper distribution of ventilation air throughout a space can create a 
multitude of contaminant-related problems. One suggested remedy for controlling 
airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been the addition of temporary protective 
barriers, such as clear Plexiglas or polycarbonate plastics, to intercept the movement of 
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aerosols from point to point. When in-person interactions cannot be avoided, barriers can 
provide a physical separation between people to support social and physical distancing 
efforts. However, if not designed or installed appropriately, such barriers may obstruct or 
interfere with the designed ventilation system airflow. The effectiveness of installing these 
barriers may be less than anticipated and, in some cases, may result in worsened 
conditions. This would be due to particulate diffusion coefficients and other factors that 
affect airflow directions and patterns, potentially resulting in dead zones where 
contaminants can build up over time. A variety of methods are available to visualize the 
nature of the airflow patterns in the indoor environment. These methods may be useful in 
evaluating these potential concerns (105). These methods include physical indicators 





Replacing air in an occupied space with clean air is the most important way to control 
viral exposure with ventilation. The maximum amount of clean outside air (theoretically, 
100% being the most protective) is optimal from the standpoint of minimizing viral load. 
However, due to heating and cooling requirements and humidity controls, this is typically 
not possible with existing or even modified HVAC systems. Filtration of recirculated air at 
the appropriate level may be capable of lowering the viral level to be reasonably as clean 
as “fresh” outdoor air.  Thus, from a practical standpoint the clean air being provided can 
be a combination of as much outside air as the ventilation system can handle, plus the 
appropriately cleaned recirculated air. 
The amount of recirculated, filtered air can be referred to as the clean air delivery rate 
(CADR), expressed in units of actual cubic feet per minute (ACFM) or liters per second 
(LPS). The CADR was developed by the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers 
(AHAM) (106) as a standardized testing and reporting method for the efficacy of air 
cleaners (see the section on portable air cleaners). This CADR concept can also be 
applied to the effective amount of cleaned recirculated air from a HVAC system, based 
on the efficiency of its filters. It is estimated as the product of the actual recirculated supply 
airflow rate and the effective aerosol removal efficiency: 
  CADR = airflow rate (ACFM) × removal efficiency. 
This amount of filtered air, plus any fresh, outside air, can then be used to calculate the 
number of ACH as follows: 
  ACH = {[CADR + Outside Air (ACFM)] × 60 (min/hr)}/room volume (cu ft). 
Filters 
 
Properly installed and maintained filters are essential in HVAC systems to remove 
particles from both outdoor (fresh) air and indoor (recirculated) air. Four different 
collection mechanisms govern particulate air filter performance: inertial impaction, 
interception, diffusion (i.e., Brownian motion), and electrostatic attraction. The first three 
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of these mechanisms relate to mechanical filters, and they are influenced by particle size 
(Figure 5) (107).  
 
Figure 5: Classic Collection Efficiency Curve with Filter Collection Mechanisms 
Source: Adapted from NIOSH (107). See also Brosseau (108). 
 
High efficiency filters each exhibit a unique efficiency curve as determined by the particle 
capture efficiency of the filter related to each of the three mechanical capture efficiency 
mechanisms stated above, along with the media velocity of the airstream (Figure 6). The 
classic combined efficiency curve for each filter is centered about the most penetrating 
particle size (MPPS) for that specific filter. Filtration efficiency increases for particles that 
are either larger or smaller than the MMPS for each filter. Impaction and interception are 
the dominant collection mechanisms for larger particles, while diffusion is dominant for 




Figure 6: Filter efficiency curves for various minimum efficiency reporting values (MERV) 




Air filters are commonly described and rated based upon their collection efficiency, 
pressure drop (or airflow resistance), and particulate-holding capacity (107). Arrestance 
describes the ability of a filter to capture synthetic test dust. Further information on the 
testing of filters is provided in Appendix B.  
 
While the highest efficiency filters, such as HEPA and ultra-low penetration air (ULPA) 
filters, have been calculated to exhibit an MMPS between 0.11 and 0.21 µm in diameter, 
HEPA filters are rated for their efficiency at removing 0.3 µm diameter particles. The 
MERV method for rating filters that are not HEPA or ULPA filters provides filtration 
efficiency curves over a 0.3 to 10 µm diameter particle size range for clean and dust-
loaded filters (110). These data provide a reliable means of selecting filters for control of 
respirable size particles, including bioaerosols. MERV ratings are compiled on a 1 to 16 
scale, which describes a filter’s minimum performance for comparison to other filters. It 
enables the user to select a filter that addresses the user’s critical size efficiency criteria 






Figure 7: Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) parameters.  
Source: ASHRAE Standard 52.2-2017, Table 12-1 (110). 
  
Filters in HVAC systems should be of the highest rating, compatible with the system and 
the air-handler fan. The filters must meet the filtration efficiency necessary to remove the 
contaminant or biological agent of concern. When the filters are of the same physical 
configuration and a filter’s MERV rating increases, the filter pressure drop across the filter 
also increases.  
 
If higher-efficiency filters are installed in a system designed for lower efficiency filters, it 
may be necessary to modify the air-handler’s filter housing. It may also be necessary to 
replace the air-handler fan motor and/or blower to accommodate the increased 
resistance/pressure drop. Most central air handlers can support flat panel filters with a 
MERV rating of 7 or 8. These filters, however, are not effective at capturing bioaerosols 
and other particles in the size range of 0.3 to 3.0 µm, which includes particles such as 
fungal spores and viruses. For this reason, filters with a MERV rating of 13 or greater are 







Air filters come in a wide range of types and configurations. The most common filters are 
panel filters, which are typically constructed as one, two, or four-inch panels, and are 
available in a variety of common or custom sizes. These panels are usually constructed 
of cardboard or metal frames, with a fiberglass, cotton-polyester, or synthetic media fill 
that may be in the form of a thick fiberglass or polyester pad or a thin pleated media bed 
with extended surfaces.  
 
These filters typically have low efficiency values of MERV 1 to MERV 8, although some 
higher efficiency models (up to MERV 15) are becoming increasingly available. Panel 
filters are often used as pre-filters to more expensive, higher efficiency final filters.  See 
Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8: Panel filters from left to right: fiberglass disposable, high efficiency mini-pleat, 
linked polyester internal ring panel, pleated panel filter 
Source: Courtesy of Tri-Dim Filter Corporation (111). 
 
Higher efficiency filters, made of fiberglass or synthetic fiber media, are available in 
various configurations, such as bag or pocket filters, pleated box or cartridge filters, and 
multi-panel wedge filters. See Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: Higher efficiency filters (MERV ratings 11 and above) from left to right: pocket or 
bag filter, synthetic mini-pleat cell filter, aluminum separator fiberglass pleated cell filter, 
rigid fiberglass deep pleat, multi-panel wedge filter 
Source: Courtesy of Tri-Dim Filter Corporation (111). 
 
Panel filters, as shown in Figure 8, are typically installed in side access, slide-in formed 
metal tracks. Formed metal tracks typically offer no sealing mechanism at the filter-to-
track interface, or between filters that are installed side-by-side. This lack of sealing 
results in significant leakage via air bypass in the final installation. Filters should be 
gasketed along the track and between each slide-in filter to reduce bypass. Higher 
performance extruded tracks with nylon pile seals may be available in some instances to 
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reduce filter to track leakage. Often, standard size filters do not completely fill the track. 
In situations where filters do not completely fill the entire filter bank, permanently installed, 
gasketed, blank-off plates should be installed to close any gaps in the final installed rack. 
 
Higher efficiency filters (i.e., MERV ratings 11 and above), as shown in Figure 9, are 
typically installed in face-loading filter frames arranged in built-up filter racks. These 
frames are normally caulked in place and are gasketed along the filter-to-frame interface 
to reduce air bypass or leakage. The filter is installed onto the gasketed frame and held 
in place with turn clips or spring clips. The frames may be furnished with extended clips 
to allow for the installation of a panel pre-filter. The purpose of the pre-filter is to extend 
the life of the high efficiency final filter.   
 
In any of these installations, it is important to examine the rack or frame system at each 
filter change out, in order to minimize bypass.  Filters should never be removed or re-
installed without shutting down and locking out the fan system power. This is done to 
prevent dislodged dust from entering the air handling system. Before restarting the fan, 
the filter housing should be vacuumed to remove any dust or debris generated during the 
filter change out process.   
 
5. Air Cleaners to Reduce Infectious Disease Exposures  
 
While increasing outdoor air ventilation rates and retrofitting HVAC systems with 
enhanced filters can reduce exposure risks in indoor environments, these approaches 
take significant time and capital cost. Most existing HVAC systems in buildings and 
facilities were not initially designed and constructed to comply with healthcare codes and 
requirements. Therefore, these systems cannot deliver the amount of outside air 
ventilation or accommodate a high level of filtration without potentially damaging the 
equipment or failing to control the indoor environment. Portable air cleaners can be 
selected, sized, installed, and operated without modifying existing mechanical ventilation 
systems. They can still provide effective control of potentially infectious aerosols. 
 
Measures to clean indoor air can help to reduce the concentrations of pathogen-
containing aerosols. These measures can subsequently reduce the risk of infectious 
disease transmission by supplementing the benefits of outdoor air ventilation. Portable 
air cleaners offer the most readily available, temporary, off-the-shelf approach to 
effectively reduce localized indoor exposures to infectious bioaerosols outside of 
healthcare settings. Air cleaners meet several criteria of an ideal engineering control: they 
can be rapidly installed, can capture aerosols close to the source, and in most cases, do 
not require significant effort, training, or expertise by users or occupants.  
 
Standalone air cleaners (e.g., portable HEPA filtered units) can be used to supplement 
outdoor air ventilation supplied through HVAC systems in order to achieve an equivalent 
air exchange rate (AER). These air cleaners are capable of significantly reducing 
infectious aerosol concentrations in workplaces and offices. Ultraviolet germicidal 
irradiation (UVGI) and other technologies that inactivate but do not capture viruses may 
be capable of reducing airborne concentrations of infectious aerosols (112).   
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Portable Air Cleaners 
 
In its 2003 “Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities,” and 
reinforced in the 2019 update, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (113) 
p. 228 recommended using “…recirculation HEPA filters…to increase the equivalent 
room air exchanges.” The guidelines further recommend that, “Recirculating devices with 
HEPA filters may have potential uses in existing facilities as interim, supplemental 
environmental controls to meet requirements for the control of airborne infectious agents.”  
 
The use of in-room portable air cleaners for supplemental control of particles (including 
bioaerosols) has increased in recent years. However, air cleaners are subject to some of 
the same limitations as dilution ventilation. For example, low airflow rates limit the 
performance of many portable air cleaners (114). Therefore, in order to be effective, air 
cleaners must be appropriately sized for optimum particle removal. The rate of air 
circulation through a unit must be greater than the source emission rate. It must also be 
capable of delivering a volume of clean air commensurate with the size of the space. This 
may be difficult to achieve for strong sources and in large spaces. Portable air cleaners 
using HEPA filters or electrostatic precipitators have demonstrated the highest efficiency 
with respect to particle removal (115-118). Also, air cleaners with 90%-efficient filters 
have shown promise as supplemental control measures to prevent certain airborne 
infectious diseases (119, 120). However, the availability of air cleaners that use HEPA 
filters make them more desirable to reduce disease transmission risks. 
 
When installing or placing portable air cleaners, it is important to avoid interfering with 
existing HVAC systems, or inadvertently directing potentially contaminated air into a clean 
area. This often requires the expertise of an engineer, an industrial hygienist, or an 
experienced contractor to properly site each device (112). 
 
The term “portable air cleaners” covers a wide range of devices that are intended to 
remove or reduce airborne contaminant concentrations through a variety of methods. Not 
all air cleaners are effective at controlling airborne contaminants, or at significantly 
reducing health risks from physical, chemical, or biological agents, despite manufacturer 
claims. Without regulatory requirements, and with little enforcement of unwarranted 
claims relating to health benefits, consumers must proceed with skepticism, and must 
perform their own due diligence.  
 
As mentioned previously, the AHAM has developed a standardized testing and reporting 
method for the efficacy of air cleaners, called the CADR (106). The CADR indicates the 
volume of filtered air an air cleaner delivers, with separate scores for tobacco smoke, 
pollen, and dust. The higher the CADR number for each pollutant, the faster the unit filters 
the air. This method does not directly address airborne pathogens (e.g., viruses, bacteria, 
fungi, etc.), but it can be a useful surrogate to compare different air cleaners. The US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) evaluates claims for air cleaners to control 
pathogens. According to the March 2020 FDA guidance related to SARS-CoV-2, “…air 
purifying devices are intended for medical purposes to kill pathogens/microorganisms in 
the air by exposure to UV radiation or remove them through filtration” (121), p. 7. For 
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SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens, the FDA recommends that air purifiers (cleaners) 
demonstrate a 4-log (i.e., 99.99%) reduction of agents through a combination of capture 
or destruction.  
 
Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation 
 
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) has been used for supplemental control (with 
ventilation being the primary control technique) of airborne microbial contamination in 
indoor spaces. UVGI systems have been utilized for disinfection and inactivation of fungal 
and bacterial microorganisms since the 1930s (122). A classic study by Wells et al. (123) 
used germicidal lamps in schools to prevent the epidemic spread of measles. Riley and 
Nardell (124) described the merits of UVGI to control other infectious aerosols and 
discussed considerations for proper lamp placement, installation, and maintenance. 
Germicidal lamp intensity to achieve good killing of airborne microorganisms must be 
balanced with the need to protect people from overexposure to ultraviolet radiation. 
Germicidal lamp fixtures have been placed in HVAC system ductwork, laboratory areas 
and airlocks, operating rooms, and crowded waiting rooms and assembly areas (125).  
 
Direct irradiation of room air, as well as in-place and portable air cleaners that return room 
air after filtration or UV irradiation, have been studied for control of airborne infectious 
agents (119, 120, 126). UVGI is used to directly irradiate room air and may be an 
appropriate means of protecting workers against airborne infectious diseases (127). 
However, worker eye and skin exposures to UVGI must not exceed recommended 
exposure limits (128-130). Such engineering interventions to control airborne infection 
have been discussed at length in the TB control literature (129, 131). It is noted that the 
principles are broadly applicable to other airborne infections. 
 
UVGI has been suggested to provide a supplemental control technology for SARS-CoV-
2 applications. It is important to note that many factors can reduce the effectiveness of 
UVGI systems, many of which may not be readily recognized by users. Therefore, 
constant maintenance and verification of system performance is needed. UVGI 
equipment often requires significant modification to existing mechanical equipment, as 
well as a requirement for ongoing service of the UVGI system. 
 
Note: The use of UVGI at typical wavelengths (i.e., ~ 254 nm) requires protection from 
the UV source for all occupants, including both employees and maintenance personnel. 
This necessary because UV exposure is harmful to human skin and eyes at relatively low 
source power. Far UVC, at wavelengths less than 222 nm, has been shown to be at least 
as effective as 254 nm but with little or no adverse health effects (132). Far UVC 
disinfection systems can be used in occupied public spaces with no special protections 
from UVGI irradiation (133, 134). However, studies are still ongoing to determine whether 
far UVC can be effective in commercial and other large-scale application where UVGI is 








Ozone generators have not been shown to effectively remove bioaerosols (117). Also, 
other studies have found that ozone is not an effective gas-phase biocide. Ozone is a 
toxic gas that, at concentrations capable of inactivating pathogens and environmental 
microbes, causes adverse health effects in people. The US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) (135) recommends not using ozone generators in occupied spaces. When 
used at concentrations that do not exceed public health standards, ozone applied to 
indoor air does not effectively remove viruses, bacteria, mold, or other biological 
pollutants (135). 
 
Ozone damages the lungs when inhaled. Even at low concentrations, ozone can cause 
chest pain, coughing, shortness of breath, and throat irritation. Ozone also worsens 
asthma and other chronic respiratory diseases and compromises the body’s ability to fight 
respiratory infections. Individual susceptibility to ozone varies. However, it has been found 
that even healthy people can experience adverse effects, such as breathing problems, 
when exposed to ozone. Recovery from the harmful effects of short- or long-term ozone 
exposure can occur, but lasting damage can be anticipated when exposed to higher levels 
or for longer durations (136). 
 
Incidental ozone production from indoor equipment should be minimized and managed. 
Intentional production of ozone indoors should be treated as a pesticidal application with 
all necessary precautions and oversight, and it should only be done in unoccupied 
spaces. Neither people nor animals should be present in indoor spaces where ozone is 
generated or where it is allowed to accumulate at concentrations above ambient or 
outdoor levels. 
 
Air cleaning or purification devices that use ozone production, UV, ionization (e.g., bipolar, 
corona discharge, etc.), electrostatic, photocatalytic oxidation, or other novel approaches 
that claim to reduce or kill bioaerosols, including viruses, bacteria, and fungi, are defined 
under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) as “pesticide 
devices” (137). This definition does not include devices used to treat persons infected 
with microorganisms. Historically, devices that are regulated under this program include 
UV light units that claim to kill, inactivate or suppress growth of fungi, bacteria or viruses. 
It also includes air treatment units (i.e., air cleaners or air purifiers) that claim to reduce 
or eliminate microorganisms or allergens, including air filter units, air ionizer/electrolytic 
units, air ozonation units, and air UV light units.  
 
While the EPA Office of Pesticide Programs does not require registration of such devices 
in the same manner as it does for pesticide chemicals, there is a requirement that 
manufacturers have data to support their claims (137). However, unlike registrants of 
pesticide products, FIFRA does not require device producers to submit any data 
concerning either safety or efficacy of a device prior to distribution or sale. This is 
particularly important to note for antimicrobial pesticide devices that claim to disinfect, 
sanitize, and/or sterilize items or ambient air. Because microorganisms are generally not 
visible to the naked eye, users of such devices by and large cannot evaluate the actual 
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performance of the device. The device may be “misbranded” if labels, labeling, and/or 
websites for devices, including general or specific efficacy claims, contain any statement, 
design, or graphic representation that is “false or misleading in any particular” (137). 
Distribution or sale of a misbranded device is prohibited under FIFRA. Therefore, every 
producer or seller of such devices is responsible for ensuring that these products perform 
as claimed, and that performance claims are not misleading to the intended user. The 
EPA can enforce compliance for devices that fail to comply with the act, or mislabel the 
device, or make false claims. 
A pesticide device that is EPA regulated and that has successfully met the requirements 
under FIFRA will include an EPA Establishment Number on the label, on the device, or in 
the user manual. Pesticidal devices must be produced in an EPA registered pesticide-
producing establishment. Obtaining an establishment number is an administrative 
process that is completed upon request to the EPA. EPA establishment numbers are 
composed of a company number, followed by a two-letter US state or three-letter country 
abbreviation, followed by the unique facility number (e.g., xxxx-PA-xx; xxxxx-CHN-xxxx) 
(137).    
Summary 
This publication from ACGIH® concerns engineering controls, including ventilation, in non-
industrial settings such as: office buildings, public and private schools, theaters, 
commercial buildings, and public buildings such court houses. The publication does not 
address engineering controls for healthcare facilities. It is also not intended for use of 
engineering controls, including ventilation, in residences, either single or multi-family.     
There is a separate ACGIH® publication, Ventilation for Industrial Settings during the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, which was written to address engineering controls for industrial 
facilities to address concerns about SARS-CoV-2 contagion. This publication, which 
focuses on non-industrial settings, has broadened the scope to include all bioaerosols, 
including contagious viruses such as SARS-CoV-2. 
As noted in the section Hierarchy of Controls, there are a variety of recommended 
approaches that can be taken to control exposures to a contagious virus or other 
bioaerosols. The most common approach for the occupational safety and health 
professional is the “Hierarchy of Controls” (Figure 1). This approach has been utilized 
successfully in a number of industrial settings where hazardous chemicals are found and 
are used daily, and can equally be applied to non-industrial settings. These controls, listed 
here from the most effective to the least effective, include elimination, substitution, 
engineering controls, administrative controls, and PPE. All of these types of controls have 
a place in protecting workers from bioaerosols, and often multiple controls are needed.  
Other approaches that have been used successfully in industrial settings include control 
banding, which may be applicable in non-industrial settings as well. In this approach, the 
occupational health and safety professional examines the pathogen that is of concern, 
the pathway that the pathogen takes to reach the target, and the routes of transmission 
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(airborne, droplet, fomite) that the pathogen must take in order to infect the target. This 
method can be used in conjunction with the hierarchy of controls as listed in the previous 
paragraph to address the potential for contagion. 
As noted in the section Ventilation, ventilation standards such as ASHRAE Standard 62.1 
have historically been used to provide guidance regarding occupant-generated and low-
level indoor air pollutants. But it is noted that ASHRAE Standard 62.1 was not developed 
to control infectious disease transmission. Therefore, past and current ventilation 
standards geared toward general contaminants should not be relied upon to prevent 
transmission of airborne infectious diseases. In addition, it is generally agreed that 
general ventilation does not control droplet transmission (1, 138-140). However, a 
ventilation system, if designed and implemented properly by a qualified and competent 
professional such as a Professional Engineer (PE) in mechanical engineering, can play 
a critical role in controlling the dissemination of bioaerosols throughout workplaces by 
reducing droplet nuclei, aerosol, and airborne transmission of bioaerosols. 
The proper installation of ventilation system components by qualified and competent 
contractors is also critical to the long-term operation and maintenance of the system. In 
particular, it is important to select the appropriate filters to be used in the system, and that 
the filter efficiency is sufficient for the prevention of bioaerosol transmission. As stated in 
the section Filter Efficiency, filters should be of the highest rating, compatible with the 
HVAC system and air-handler fan, which will meet the filtration efficiency necessary to 
remove the contaminant or biological agent of concern. 
This publication also discusses portable air cleaners, UVGI, and other technologies that 
may be supplemental to the properly engineered and installed general ventilation system. 
These technologies may be of use in specific circumstances where supplemental air flow 
and filtration and/or cleaning is needed. However, it is generally agreed that these 
technologies, if used, should not replace the ventilation system as the primary means of 
preventing the spread of infectious bioaerosols, including SARS-CoV-2, in non-industrial 
settings. Their use in select situations should be discussed with a qualified and competent 
professional before they are considered for use in a building. 
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Appendix A 
1. Decision Matrix for Control Measures
The following provides relative concepts for assessing the hazards risks associated with 
bioaerosol exposures. Since the application of these decision matrices depends on the 
agent and circumstances of exposure, the practitioner should have sufficient experience 
and knowledge regarding the class of agents and/or the individual agent of concern in 
order to assess the risks and identify and implement the appropriate control 
recommendations. 
Hazard 
The first step in the decision matrix process is to categorize the hazard level of the specific 
agent, based upon the severity of possible adverse health outcomes and the type of 
adverse health effects caused by the biological agent.  
Table A-1 
Hazard Categorization 
Catastrophic Critical Treatable Marginal Negligible 
Toxic 
Response 4 4 4 2 2 
Infection 4 4 3 2 2 
Irritation 4 3 2 2 1 
Sensitization 4 3 2 1 1 
Allergy/Asthma 3 2 2 1 1 
Exposure Potential 
The second step is to categorize the potential for exposure, based upon the anticipated 
intensity or magnitude of exposure, and the duration and/or frequency of exposures to 
the specific agent. The categories listed below are relative to the class of agents or 
specific agent of concern and should be modified accordingly.   
Table A-2 provides intensity categories (horizontal row) that would be generally 
associated with readily releasable environmental agents, such as fungal spores and dust-
borne agents present on contaminated materials or surfaces where entrainment/re-
entrainment is likely. For these bioaerosols, the frequency and/or duration column can be 
a simple scale indicating relative frequency and duration. For non-environmental agents, 
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such as viruses and infectious bacteria that are primarily spread through human-to-
human contact, the intensity categories might be better suited to the agent’s relative 
potential for transmission and the potential dose. For example, the intensity row could 
include factors that indicate the presence and number of infected individuals; room size; 
ventilation and filtration present; the distance between infected individual and non-
infected individuals; the relative infectivity or virulence of the agent, if variable (e.g., 
different serotypes of Legionella pneumophila); presence of comorbidities, etc. The 
frequency and duration column could include both frequency of contact with infected 













Constant 4 4 4 3 2 
Chronic/ 
Interrupted 4 4 3 2 2 
Chronic/ 
Episodic 4 3 3 2 1 
Occasional 3 3 2 1 1 
Acute/Short 
Term 3 2 1 1 1 
Risk 
Using the categorical values obtained from Tables A-1 and A-2 for a particular agent, one 
can estimate the risk level for that agent by creating a matrix similar to Table A-3, where 
the risk is the sum of the hazard and exposure category values for the specific agent. 
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Table A-3  
 









Exposure Category 4 8 7 6 5 
Exposure Category 3 7 6 5 4 
Exposure Category 2 6 5 4 3 
Exposure Category 1 5 4 3 2 
 
2. Potential Controls 
 
The potential controls listed below are provided for guidance and should be tailored to the 
agent and circumstances under which exposure to the agent may occur. Significant 
differences in control strategies would be required for opportunistic environmental fungi 
that might place an immunocompromised individual at risk of infection (e.g., Aspergillus 
fumigatus), but whose health effects are typically limited to allergies, in comparison to a 
viral pathogen that is readily transmissible and has a high infectivity rate or virulence. The 
following control strategies were developed for environmental agents present in or on 
contaminated materials and/or surfaces, such as fungi, and may or may not be 
appropriate for different agents and under different circumstances. Note that as each risk 
level increases, the controls for the lower risk should be included as part of the higher risk 
controls.   
 
For exposures in Risk Level 2, focus on minimizing the duration and frequency of 
exposure for immunocompetent persons. For persons with possibly compromised or 
suppressed immune systems, avoiding exposures to bioaerosols is recommended. Low 
level exposures with risk characterization in this category should be minimized or avoided, 
if possible, but brief duration exposures to these agents typically can be tolerated and 
pose little risk to most individuals. 
 
For exposures in Risk Levels 3 and 4, for brief exposure periods, PPE including 
respiratory protection and other equipment, in conjunction with applicable administrative 
controls (such as minimizing the duration of exposure) can be considered, while source 
elimination should be addressed for chronic or long-term exposures. 
 
For exposures in Risk Levels 5 and 6, NIOSH-approved respirators, with an assigned 
protection factor (APF) of 10 or higher, should be used for brief exposure periods. For 
intermediate and long-term exposures, rely upon administrative controls, source 
elimination, and engineering controls. 
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For exposures in Risk Levels 7 and 8, use a combination of respiratory protection, with 
an APF of 100 or greater, and feasible engineering and administrative controls for short-
term exposures until or while mitigation is occurring.  
When infectious sources are not readily identified, as is often the case, individual 
exposure to infectious aerosols is best minimized or reduced by following general 
precautions of good hygiene and sanitation. Standard precautions against airborne 
infections aim to avoid any exposure to aerosols from other people, the environment, or 
animals. Minimizing direct contact with surfaces where airborne agents may settle 
through cleaning, sanitizing, and proper hand hygiene is also part of good hygiene 
practice for preventing transmission.  
Other functional precautions may be administrative, such as policies that encourage ill 
workers to remain home until no longer infectious. Likewise, workers at high risk due to 
temporary or permanent immunodeficiency, or other predisposed underlying health 
conditions, should be excluded from assignments that may expose them to opportunistic 
pathogens. Another example of an administrative measure to control exposure would be 
the decision to minimize populations of infectious sources through limiting the number of 
individuals housed in facilities where a greater percentage of potential infectious sources 





1. Filter Testing and Classification 
 
Arrestance is calculated as a percentage of dust retained on the test filter, versus the 
amount of dust fed into the test filter, on a weight basis. Dust spot efficiency classifies a 
filter according to its ability to remove finer airborne dusts that can visibly soil interior 
surfaces. Dust spot efficiency is calculated as a percentage of staining of a test target 
located downstream of the test filter, versus the staining of an identical test target located 
upstream of the test filter. A comparison of the two targets is based on light transmission 
through each test target. For example, if the upstream test target demonstrates half the 
light transmission of the downstream target, the filter is rated at 50% dust spot efficiency. 
This light transmission test is conducted during the filter test following subsequent filter 
loadings of the filter with the synthetic test dust. This test in no way predicts the filter’s 
ability to capture and retain a particle of any specific size. 
 
The MERV method for rating filters is based on a fractional aerosol efficiency test 
developed by Hanley et al. (141). This efficiency testing method provides filtration 
efficiency curves over the 0.3 to 10 µm diameter particle size range for clean and dust-
loaded filters. These data provide a more reliable means of selecting filters for control of 
respirable size particles, including bioaerosols, than the previous methods. The standard 
prescribes the filter’s fractional efficiency for particles of various optical particle diameters. 
Filter efficiencies are based upon removal of particles in 12 specific particle diameters 
over six cycles, the first with no loading and then five with loading. The filter is loaded with 
size-standardized loading dust over the five loadings to simulate accumulation of dust 
over the service life of the device.  
 
Polydispersed potassium chloride (KCl) aerosol is generated and the concentrations are 
measured upstream and downstream in each particle size, ranging from 0.3 to 10 µm in 
diameter, with an optical particle counter (OPC). Removal efficiency for each particle size 
is determined following the successive filter loading using the standardized test dust, and 
a composite efficiency curve is generated based upon the average minimum removal 
efficiency within the three group size ranges (0.3 to 1.0 µm; 1.0 to 3.0 µm; 3.0 to 10 µm).   
 
Each of the fractional efficiencies is charted and the lowest efficiency measured during 
the successive filter loadings is used to determine the filter’s minimum efficiency curve. 
The lowest efficiency is chosen to avoid confusion with average efficiency and to provide 
a minimum expected performance criterion. The composite efficiency for each of these 
three groups is then used to calculate the average particle size efficiency (PSE). See 
Figures B-1 and B-2. 
 
33 
Figure B-1: Sample air-cleaner performance report summary. PSE after incremental dust 
loading. 
Source: ASHRAE Standard 52.2-2017, Figure C-2 (110). 
Lowest one from each data point. 
Figure B-2: Sample air-cleaner performance report summary. Composite minimum 
efficiency curve. 
Source: ASHRAE Standard 52.2-2017, Figure C-3 (110). 
The filter’s MERV rating is determined by averaging the four minimum efficiencies in each 
of the three grouped size ranges, and comparing the results to Table 12 from the 
ASHRAE Standard 52.2 – 2017 (Figure B-1), to assign a MERV rating for a given filter 
(110).   
Specific configurations may offer either lower, or higher, pressure drops for the same 
MERV rating, but may also require differing system hardware for their installation. For 
instance, a 26-inch deep, MERV 10 synthetic pocket filter may offer a lower resistance 
34 
than a 2-inch deep MERV 7 pleated panel filter, but it will probably not be compatible with 
the filter rack designed for the 2-inch deep MERV 7 filter. Similarly, a 2-inch deep MERV 
15 mini-pleat panel may fit into the MERV 7 filter rack, but the MERV 15 filter’s increased 
resistance will compromise the system’s fan capacity.   
ASHRAE Standard 52 does not cover HEPA filters, which were previously considered 
MERV 17 and higher. Most building ventilation systems cannot and do not need to be 
retrofitted with true HEPA filters.  
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